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Sturrup v. Mahan and its Progeny:
Is There a Constitutional Right to Play
High School Basketball in Indiana?
l.

INTRODUCTION

If asked to identify individual rights and freedoms protected under the United States Constitution or the constitution of a
particular state, most Americans could name freedom of religion, freedom of expression, the right to vote, and the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Likewise, most
educators are familiar with the major cases in which the United States Supreme Court has measured the policies, rules and
procedures of the public schools against the basic guarantees
found in the Bill of Rights. For example, in Brown v. Board of
Education, the Supreme Court established that the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection under the law
forbids racial segregation in public schools. 1 In Goss v. Lopez,
the Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
certain procedural safeguards within public school discipline
actions. 2 In these cases, the Court employed a high level of
scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of state action.
Surprisingly, some case law suggests that participation in
high school athletics deserves a special level of constitutional
protection similar to that of the Brown and Goss cases. In 1974,
the Indiana Supreme Court decided Sturrup v. Mahan, 3 and
announced that the Indiana High School Athletic Association
(IHSAA) bylaws affecting student eligibility may be subjected
to mid-tier judicial scrutiny under equal protection analysis.
This decision set a far-reaching precedent by which many other
high school students have challenged IHSAA eligibility rulings.4 Although it is laudable that the Indiana courts have set
aside seemingly unfair applications of IHSAA eligibility rules,

1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
3. Sturrup v. Mahan, 305 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. 1974).
4. See Jordan v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 813 F. Supp. 1372 (S.D.
Ind. 1993); Thomas v. Greencastle Community Sch. Corp., 603 N.E.2d 190 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992); Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992); Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Raike, 329 N.E.2d 66 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1975).

223

224

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[1994

their decisions have created more confusion than clarity. The
cause of this confusion may be traced back to the Sturrup decision itself. Recently Sturrup's shortcomings have again been
highlighted as Indiana courts have been called upon to apply
this precedent to different permutations of eligibility cases.
Part II of this casenote examines the Sturrup decision.
Part III addresses the threshold question of whether the
IHSAA engages in state action and is governed by the Equal
Protection Clause. Part IV criticizes the court's analysis in
Sturrup for not explaining the constitutional basis for its special treatment of IHSAA rules, failing to define the actual level
of scrutiny it was applying, and incorrectly invoking federal
constitutional authority. Part V illustrates the problems associated with using Sturrup as legal precedent by examining two
recent Indiana Appellate Court cases. Finally, Part VI concludes that Sturrup is too enigmatic to be of value as legal
precedent, and that the Indiana Supreme Court should either
satisfactorily explain its decision, or overturn it.
II. Sturrup v.
A.

Mahan

Facts of the Case

In the summer of 1971, Warren Sturrup moved from the
home of his mother in Miami, Florida, to live with his older
brother in Bloomington, Indiana. 5 His change of residence was
prompted by the "demoralizing and detrimental conditions"
that existed in his home and school environments. 6 At trial it
was established that there was widespread use of narcotics
among Sturrup's peers at Miami Palmetto High School, and
specifically among his friends on the basketball team. 7 Furthermore, Sturrup lived in a two-bedroom home with his parents
and ten sisters; consequently he could not study at home. 8
Finally, Sturrup's mother had a heart condition which prevented her from giving him the discipline or the attention he needed.9
Mter Sturrup's change of residence, his brother, Lamount,
was appointed legal guardian by the Monroe Circuit Court. 10
5. Sturrup, 305 N.E.2d at 878.
6. ld.
7. ld. at 878, n.l.

8. ld.
9. ld.
10. ld. at 881.
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Once enrolled at University Junior-Senior High School, however, Sturrup was declared ineligible to play basketball by his
principal, Robert Mahan. Mter consultation with Commissioner
Eskew of the Indiana High School Athletic Association, Mahan
interpreted IHSAA Rule 12, Section 1 as disqualifying Sturrup
from any inter-school sports for the entire school year. 11 The
rule reads:
No student, who has been enrolled as a high school student in
any member school, shall be permitted to participate in any
inter-school contest as a member of another member school
until he has been enrolled in such school for one calendar
year, unless the parents of such student actually change their
residence to the second school district. In the latter case, the
student will be as eligible as he was in the school from which
he withdrew. 12

Although out-of-state transferees are not specifically addressed
by Rule 12, it has been interpreted broadly and applied to them
as well. 13

B.

Procedural History and Lower Court Decisions

At the trial court level, Sturrup attempted to enjoin Mahan
and the IHSAA from declaring him ineligible for participation
in varsity sports. 14 However, this preliminary injunction was
denied. 15 Sturrup then appealed, winning a reversal of the trial
court's decision. 16 The court of appeals held that the "IHSAA
bylaws unconstitutionally burdened Warren Sturrup's fundamental right to travel among the states." 17 Therefore, the
court of appeals found that Sturrup was denied equal protection of the laws guaranteed under the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 18
In arriving at this conclusion, the court of appeals reasoned that the IHSAA constituted a state actor within the
meaning of the 14th Amendment. 19 Mter finding state action,

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

!d.
!d. at 878-79.
!d. at 878, n.2.
!d. at 879.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.; U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Sturrup, 305 N.E.2d at 879. See also Haas v. South Bend Community
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the court had to determine whether the rule in question was
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment. Generally, when making this determination, a
court will subject legislative classifications to rational basis
scrutiny. Under this analysis, if a law bears a rational relation
to the stated legislative goal, a court must uphold it-despite
its under or over-inclusive effect. 20
Under strict scrutiny analysis, when a law involves suspect
classifications or infringes on a fundamental right, the courts
will hold it unconstitutional unless the law is necessary and
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest. 21 The
court of appeals held that Rule 12 impeded Sturrup's fundamental right to travel among the states. 22 Since Mahan and
the IHSAA failed to establish that Rule 12 was necessary to
the furtherance of a compelling state interest, the court of
appeals reasoned that the bylaws denied Sturrup equal protection of the laws in violation of the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 23

C.

Indiana Supreme Court Decision

When Mahan and the IHSAA appealed, the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer of the case in order to "correct a
fundamental error in the Court of Appeals' opinion."24 Justice
Hunter, writing for the court, noted that while the Indiana
Supreme Court reached the same practical outcome as the
court of appeals, it did not agree with the lower court's application of equal protection analysis. 25 The court of appeals had
based its ruling on the United States Supreme Court's holdings

School Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972); Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v.
Schafer, 598 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Kriss v. Brown, 390 N.E.2d 193 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1979); Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. Raike, 329 N.E.2d 66 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1975).
20. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955).
21. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (race is a factor in allocating public benefits and burdens the law is suspect and subject to the most exacting scrutiny); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (interference with the fundamental
right to marry cannot be upheld unless closely tailored to effectuate a sufficiently
important state interest).
22. Sturrup, 305 N.E.2d at 879.
23. Id.
24. ld.
25. ld.
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in Shapiro v. Thompson 26 and Dunn v. Blumstein. 27 These
cases involved statutes which imposed durational residency requirements for receiving welfare assistance and voting rights.
The Court struck down both statutes on the grounds that they
interfered with the fundamental right of interstate travel.
Justice Hunter, however, distinguished Shapiro and Dunn
from the present case since, in those decisions, the statutes in
question applied only to individuals who moved from out of
state. 28 Thus, people moving from out of state and those
changing residence within the state, although similarly situated, were treated differently under the law. In Sturrup, however, Rule 12 treated similarly situated people equally, regardless
of whether they move from within or without the state, and
therefore, the rule does not infringe upon the right of interstate
travel. 29 For this reason, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected
the reasoning of the appellate court.
Mter finding the appellate court's reasoning was flawed,
the majority of the Indiana Supreme Court went on to affirm
the judgment on different Equal Protection grounds. Writing
for the majority, Justice Hunter began by discussing Rule 12's
"constitutional infirmity."30 On their face, IHSAA bylaws appear to be well tailored to achieving desirable ends. The objective of IHSAA bylaws, and Rule 12 in particular, is to prevent
the "despicable and odious" practices of "recruitment, proselyting, and school 'jumping' for athletic reasons."31 Justice Hunter wrote: "Said bylaws are unreasonable in that they sweep too
broadly in their proscription and, hence, violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment."32
Justice Hunter criticized Rule 12 for creating an over-inclusive class with its irrebuttable conclusion that all transfer students that do not fall within one of two narrow exceptions are
participating in unfair recruiting practices. 33 For example, a
student transferring from a public school to a parochial school
for purely religious reasons would be barred from varsity sports
even though this outcome would in no way further IHSAA

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
Sturrup, 305 N.E.2d at 880.

Id.
Id. at 881.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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objectives. Looking at the ultimate purpose of IHSAA bylaws,
the court determined that there was no basis for declaring
Sturrup ineligible. 34
III.

DOES THE IHSAA ENGAGE IN STATE ACTION?

Mter reading Sturrup, one might wonder why the Indiana
Supreme Court did not pose the threshold question of whether
IHSAA eligibility rulings can be considered state action for
purposes of Equal Protection analysis. This question is significant because if the IHSAA is found to engage in state action,
its bylaws and enforcement mechanisms are subject to plenary
judicial review. 35 If it is not considered a state actor, then the
IHSAA is largely insulated from review under the principle of
judicial deference to the policies ofvoluntary associations. 36
The state action question seems especially important given
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in NCAA v.
Tarkanian 37 and the central role that issue played in determining the standard of judicial review and, ultimately, the
judgment. Although Sturrup was decided nearly two decades
before Tarkanian, it seems strange that the Indiana Court
entirely failed to address this issue, because the Indiana Supreme Court resolved the issue just two years prior to Sturrup,
in Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp. 38 , and Haas
is perfectly reconcilable with Tarkanian.
In Haas a female high school student challenged an IHSAA
rule that kept her from competing on her school's only golf
team, a men's varsity sport. 39 The court reviewed IHSAA Rule
9, section 7 that prohibited males and females from competing
either on the same team or against teams composed of members of the opposite sex. 40 In striking down the rule on Equal
Protection grounds, the court first concluded that the IHSAA
engaged in state action. 41

34. ld.
35. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d 540, 547 (Ind.
App. Ct. 1992).
36. State ex rel. Givens v. Superior Court, 117 N.E.2d 553 (Ind. 1954); United
States Auto Club v. Woodward, 460 N.E.2d 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
37. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
38. Haas v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972).
39. ld. at 496.
40. ld.
41. ld. at 497.
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Regardless of how the IHSAA denominates itself as an organization, or how it characterizes its relationship with its
member schools, it is abundantly clear that the association's
very existence is entirely dependent upon the absolute cooperation and support of the public school systems of the State of
Indiana. The enforcement of the rules promulgated by the
IHSAA and adopted by the member schools may have a substantial impact upon the rights of students enrolled in these
tax supported institutions, and we conclude, therefore, that
the administration of interscholastic athletics by the IHSAA
should be considered to be "state action" within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42

Although the Haas decision was a departure from previous
decisions which held that the IHSAA could not be considered a
state actor, 43 it has been upheld in all subsequent Indiana
cases in which IHSAA rules were challenged as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause. 44
In Tarkanian the United States Supreme Court found that
the NCAA had not engaged in state action when compelling the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas to enforce NCAA prescribed
sanctions against Coach Tarkanian. 45 Since Haas, one federal
district court in Indiana has drawn an analogy from the NCAA
to the IHSAA to find that the IHSAA does not engage in state
action. 46 Although the decision of a federal district court sitting in Indiana is not binding precedent for the Indiana Supreme Court,47 it may be indicative of another shift in state actor analysis.
A thorough reading of Tarkanian reveals that organizations such as the IHSAA were not implicated by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision. The Court distinguished Tarkanian
from high school cases by pointing out that the NCAA is com-

42. Id. at 498. See also Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Saint Augustine
High Sch., 396 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1968).
43. State ex rel. IHSAA v. Lawrence Circuit Court, 162 N.E.2d 250 (1959).
44. Sturrup v. Mahan, 305 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. 1972); Thomas v. Greencastle
Community Sch. Corp., 603 N.E.2d 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Indiana High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n v. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Kriss v. Brown, 390
N.E.2d 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Raike, 329
N.E.2d 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).
45. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988).
46. Anderson v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 699 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Ind.
1988).
47. Security Credit Acceptance Corp. v. State, 247 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. Ct. App.
1969).
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posed of universities throughout the United States, the majority of which are not located in any one state. 48 It held that the
source of the NCAA's legislation is not the law of any one state,
but "the collective membership, speaking through an organization that is independent of any particular State."49
In a footnote to the above quoted passage, the Court stated: "The situation would, of course, be different if the membership consisted entirely of institutions located within the same
State, many of them public institutions created by the same
sovereign. 50 In an Arizona case cited by the Supreme Court,
the 9th Circuit court held that the Arizona Interscholastic
Association was a state actor because "the activities of the
[Arizona high school athletic association] are so intertwined
with the state that the regulations of the [association] must be
considered state action."51 Therefore, given the distinguishing
characteristics between the NCAA and the IHSAA and the
Supreme Court's footnote 13 from Tarkanian, there is no reason to believe that Haas would be rejected by the Supreme
Court. Likewise, there is no indication that the IHSAA should
not be found a state actor.
IV.

CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Sturrup opinion may be criticized on several levels.
First, the Indiana Supreme Court did not explain why it departed from traditional rational basis analysis. Second, and
closely related to the first point, the court failed to define the
level of review that it actually employed or the legal theory
justifying the use of this undefined level of scrutiny. Third, the
court based its opinion on the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, rather
than on similar guarantees within the Indiana State Constitution. 52 Fourth, the decision failed to create a coherent rule
upon which later actions could be judged.

48. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193.
49. !d.
50. Id. at 193, n.13; See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126
(9th Cir. 1982).
51. Clark, 695 F.2d at 1128.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; IND. CONST., art. 1, § 23; Sturrup, 305
N.E.2d at 879.
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A.

Rational Basis Scrutiny

One of the most confusing aspects of Sturrup was the
court's failure to utilize traditional rational basis scrutiny. In
his decision, Justice Hunter described Rule 12 as intended to
eliminate the "odious" practices of recruitment and school
jumping for athletic purposes. He wrote: "These transferee eligibility bylaws are reasonably related to the above-stated objective. That is to say, they are designed to and do, in fact, contribute to the realization of that goal."53 If the court were utilizing traditional rational basis review, such a finding would be
sufficient to uphold the rule. 54 Since the Indiana Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts' denial of eligibility, it is clear
that Hunter did not apply the rational basis standard.

B.

What Level of Review was Applied?

The facts of the case indicate that Rule 12 should not have
been subjected to strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is invoked only
when a law restricts a fundamental right, or burdens a suspect
classification. 55 Justice Hunter did not contend that eligibility
for high school athletics was a fundamental right, nor did he
suggest that transfer students comprised a suspect class. Furthermore, the court did not announce that the standard it employed was the same as that applicable to strict scrutiny analysis.
Under strict scrutiny, a state action will be held invalid
unless the state can prove that it is necessary and narrowly
tailored to further a compelling state interest. 56 Justice
Hunter did not discuss whether discouraging school jumping
and recruiting for athletic purposes is necessary to further a
compelling state interest. Nor did he consider whether Rule 12
is the least discriminatory means by which to achieve this
objective. Absent all of these considerations, it is difficult to
imagine that the court intended to apply strict scrutiny to the
lHSAA bylaw, or that if it did, it was justified in doing so.
Also markedly absent is any discussion of elements which
would justify an intermediate level of scrutiny. A limited number of equal protection issues have been afforded mid-tier scru-

53.
54.
55.
56.

Sturrup, 305 N.E.2d at 881.
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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tiny. These include discrimination on the basis of quasi-suspect
classification, such as gender, illegitimacy and alien status. 57
A law will fail intermediate scrutiny unless it is substantially
related to an important governmental interest. 58 Nevertheless,
Sturrup involved none of the issues traditionally associated
with mid-tier review.
In several recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has
applied a modified intermediate scrutiny to cases that involve
different, arguably suspect classes, such as age classifications,
mental illness and mental retardation. 59 Although transferee
student athletes have not been recognized by the Supreme
Court as deserving special protection in earlier cases, they
conceivably could be afforded mid-tier review as a newly recognized suspect class. This idea is problematic in that the class
implicated in Sturrup differs significantly from those recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court because transfer student
status is not an immutable characteristic and has rarely, if
ever, been the basis of discrimination. Furthermore, Justice
Hunter did not use any of the language which suggests the use
of modified intermediate level scrutiny. He made no finding of
whether Rule 12 was "substantially related to an important
governmental interest." Additionally, he did not clearly identify
an intention to recognize a new suspect classification. Therefore, one is led to believe that a modified intermediate standard
was not invoked either.

C.

Overbreadth

The decision in Sturrup was based on an "overbreadth"
analysis of Rule 12. The critical portion of the decision was extremely brief, consisting of only one paragraph, but directed
exclusively at the issue of overbreadth. Justice Hunter stated
that IHSAA transferee eligibility rules were designed to further
a valid objective: "to preserve the integrity of interscholastic
athletics by minimizing recruitment, proselyting, and school
'jumping,' for athletic reasons."60 Justice Hunter wrote:

57. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

58. ld.
59. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985), Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
60. ld. at 881.
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These transferee eligibility bylaws are reasonably related to
the above-stated objective. That is to say, they are designed to
and do, in fact, contribute to the realization of that goal. However, said bylaws are unreasonable in that they sweep too
broadly in their proscription and, hence, violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.... This is precisely where the rules sweep too broadly, they create an overinclusive class-those who move from one school to another
for reasons wholly unrelated to athletics are grouped together
with those who have been recruited or who have "jumped" for
athletic reasons. 61

Thus, after originally holding that the IHSAA bylaws were
"reasonably related" to a valid state objective, Justice Hunter
concluded that "denying eligibility to such transferees in no
way furthers IHSAA objectives."62
The decision is the first impression that the rules satisfy
the rational basis test. This is because they contribute to the
realization of a valid state objective: minimizing unfair recruitment practices. Nonetheless, Justice Hunter holds that the
rule is so broad that it does not further its objective because it
unfairly discriminates against innocent students; students who
may transfer between schools for "academic or religious reasons
or for any number of other legitimate reasons." 63 Justice
Hunter applied a standard similar to strict scrutiny analysis
and found that IHSAA bylaws were not narrowly tailored to
accomplish their objective.
The decision did not identify or name the standard applied,
nor did it cite authority to support his use of a quasi-strict
scrutiny overbreadth standard. As explained earlier, strict scrutiny is invoked only when a law restricts a fundamental right
or burdens a suspect classification. 64 There are two ways to
explain Justice Hunter's use of a quasi-strict scrutiny analysis.
Either he intended to recognize a constitutional right to play
high school basketball in Indiana, or he intended to use a new
standard, which has been called "rational basis with teeth."

61. ld.
62. ld.
63. ld.
64. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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D. Rational Basis with Teeth
Victor Rosenblum, a Northwestern University Law School
professor, has labelled the brand of review similar to that
found in Sturrup "rational basis with teeth." 65 He wrote:
''We've gotten used to the idea that if the test is rational basis,
the legislation gets an automatic pass. Now rational basis is
beginning to mean something."66 Another commentator has
suggested that courts are beginning to use this type of analysis
to "reach perceived injustices that otherwise lie beyond constitutional reach."67
Unfortunately, application of rational basis with teeth is
neither consistent nor predictable. In fact, on the rare occasions
in which the U.S. Supreme Court has used this mode of analysis, it has not labeled it as such or explained its reasoning. 68
Commentators have severely criticized this approach to constitutional law as creating too much leeway for courts to closely
scrutinize legislation whenever it so desires. Courts are also
criticized for creating confusion as to what standard of review
is actually being used. As illustrated by the case at hand, the
rational basis with teeth level of analysis is usually not identified within the text of the decision itself.Rational basis with
teeth could also be labeled intermediate review in disguise. It
is the functional equivalent of the "substantially related to an
important state interest" test69 without an accompanying explanation of what triggered it. Finally, given the absence of an
identifiable triggering classification or interest, confusion will
invariably arise over what version of the rational basis test to
apply in any given case. 70 These criticisms are clearly illustrated by Indiana High School Athletic Association v.
Schafer 71 and Thomas v. Greencastle Community School
Corp. 72

65. Quoted in Stewart, A Growing Equal Protection Clause?, 71 A.B.A. J. 108,
112-114 (1985).
66. ld.
67. ld. at 112.
68. Gayle L. Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny
by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 801 (1987).
69. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
70. Pettinga, supra note 68, at 780.
71. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992).
72. Thomas v. Greencastle Community Sch. Corp., 603 N.E.2d 190 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992).

r
I
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E. Equal Protection Under Federal and State Constitutions
It is clear from reading Sturrup that Justice Hunter based
his opinion on the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. As stated earlier, such
a basis for the decision was unprecedented. The U.S. Supreme
Court cases in which rational basis with teeth has been applied
involved legislation which burdened important rights of groups
at least approaching quasi-suspect status. 73 For example, in
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court struck down a
statute requiring a special use permit for a proposed group
home for the mentally retarded, finding that it was not rationally related to any permissible government purpose. 74 The
Court did not, however, consider whether there was any conceivable government interest in requiring a permit. Clearly
there were interests besides discrimination on the basis of
mental retardation, such as zoning requirements, public safety
or the safety of the center's residents themselves.
Apparently the Court found that the mentally retarded as
a class approached quasi-suspect classification and therefore
deserved extra protection. The group and the burdens involved
in Sturrup, however, do not approach a level of significance
equal to those in Cleburne. Accordingly, they do not deserve
enhanced rational basis scrutiny under the United States Constitution. Under traditional Equal Protection Clause analysis,
the Sturrup decision appears wrong.
The unavailability of greater than rational basis review
under the Federal Equal Protection guarantee does not
eliminate the possibility of relief. An understanding of Constitutional history indicates that federal law was never envisioned as the ultimate protector of civil liberties. In fact, for a
century and a half after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, state
constitutions remained the principal force in American civil
liberties. 7s What Justice Hunter incorrectly attempted to justify under the Federal Constitution could legitimately have been
accomplished through application of the Indiana State Constitution, Article I, Section 23, which states, ''The General Assem-

73. Pettinga, supra note 68, at 801; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985);
74. Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432.
75. Chief Justice Randall T. Shephard, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of
Rights, 22 IND. L. REV. 575, 576 (1989).

l
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bly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges
or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally
belong to all citizens."76
Indiana case law is replete with examples of protections
provided by the Indiana Constitution not supported by the
Federal Constitution. As early as 1820, in State v. Laselle, the
Indiana Supreme Court held that "our constitution intended a
total and entire prohibition of slavery in this State.'177 More
than 100 years before Gideon v. Wainwright1 8 was decided by
the United States Supreme Court, the Indiana Supreme Court
held that a criminal defendant who could not afford an attorney had the right to representation at public expense. 79 To
this day, the Indiana Supreme Court is willing and anxious to
announce and protect rights which emanate from the state
constitution.
In his speech, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of Rights,
Randall Shepard, Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court,
laments that in appellate proceedings attorneys base their
arguments solely on the United States Constitution. 80
The rights of Americans cannot be secure if they are protected
only by courts or only by one court. Civil liberties protected
only by a U.S. Supreme Court are only as secure as the Warren Court or the Rehnquist Court wishes to make them. The
protection of Americans against tyranny requires that state
supreme courts and state constitutions be strong centers of
authority on the rights of the people. I am determined that
the Indiana Constitution and the Indiana Supreme Court be
strong protectors of those rights. 81

Shepard also suggested that in cases without remedy under the
Federal Constitution, failure to argue a claim based on the
state constitution may preclude otherwise appropriate relief on
those grounds. In Sturrup there is no clear indication of why
the court would choose to apply enhanced rational basis scru76. IND. CONST., art. I, § 23. See infra text accompanying note 95 for a discussion of an appellate court decision suggesting that Sturrup may have been properly decided based on the Indiana State Constitution.
77. State v. Lasselle, 1 Blackf. 60, 62 (Ind. 1820) as cited in Shephard, supra
note 75, at 577.
78. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
79. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18 (1854), as cited in Shepard, supra note 75,
at 578.
80. Shepard, supra note 75, at 584.
81. ld. at 586.

.
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tiny, or what precedent within Indiana state law would support
such an analysis. But there is ample precedent to support the
finding of protections under the Indiana State Constitution not
available under the Federal Constitution.

V.

Sturrup AS LEGAL PRECEDENT

Despite the lack of clarity in Sturrup itself, that decision
has been relied on extensively in cases involving the IHSAA.
Two appellate court cases illustrate problems faced by Indiana
courts when applying Sturrup, and what the Indiana Supreme
Court might do to clarify the constitutional questions surrounding eligibility for high school athletics.

A. Indiana High School Athletic Association v.

Schafer 82

1. Facts of the case
During the 1990-91 school year, Shane Schafer was a junior at Andrean High School in Merrillville, Indiana. 83
Schafer attended school during the entire fall semester. Early
in the spring semester, Schafer was forced to withdraw from
school due to a very serious sinus infection which had plagued
him throughout the school year. 84 Because of the cumulative
nature of his courses, Schafer would be forced to repeat his fall
semester courses in order to be prepared for the subsequent
spring classes. 85 In June of 1991, Schafer wrote to the IHSAA
and requested that his 1990-91 school term not be counted
against his eligibility for varsity basketball. 86 Schafer's request was denied, based on several provisions of the IHSAA
bylaws.
Most significant was Rule 18-1 on Scholarship. 87 Rule 181 states: "To be eligible scholastically, students must have received passing grades at the end of their last grading period in
school in at least five full credit subjects or the equivalent and
must be currently enrolled in at least five full credit subjects or
the equivalent. Semester grades take precedence. 88 Subpart

82. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992).
83. ld. at 542.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. ld.
87. Id. at 543.
88. ld.

238

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[1994

18-1.5 interprets the rule: "[a] subject for which credit has
previously been granted may not, if repeated, be counted to
satisfy this rule."89 Rule 18-1 was designed to prevent athletes
from retaking classes which they had already mastered in
order to gain more practice time.

2.

Procedural history

The IHSAA ruled Schafer ineligible because he would not
be enrolled in five full credit subjects during the Fall semester,
as he planned to repeat classes for which credit had already
been given. 90 Schafer challenged his ineligibility ruling in district court. 91 Schafer won his prayer for declaratory relief at
the trial level, after which the IHSAA appealed. 92 As in
Sturrup, the standard of review employed by the court was a
major issue and proved to be largely determinative of the outcome.

3.

Court of appeals

The court of appeals stated that Rule 18 rationally related
to a legitimate state interest. But the court held that their
equal protection analysis had not "run its course," because the
decision in Sturrup mandates further inquiry. 93 Judge
Barteau, writing for the court, stated that Sturrup required an
"overbreadth" analysis on top of traditional rational basis scrutiny, despite the fact that "federal decisions hold that under
traditional equal protection scrutiny a rule may not be invalidated due to overbreadth."94 To the extent that the rule in
question does not raise problems of "suspect classifications,"
the weight of precedent from other jurisdictions suggests that
overbreadth scrutiny is inappropriate. 95

89. !d.
90. !d.
91. !d. at 545.
92. !d. at 546.
93. !d. at 552.
94. !d. at 552-53. See also Walsh v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 449
U.S. 1124 (1981); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 813 (1976);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
95. See Berschback v. Grosse Point Pub. Sch. Dist., 397 N.W.2d 234, 240
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Cooper v. Oregon Sch. Activities Ass'n, 629 P.2d 386, 395
(Or. Ct. App. 1981).
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Despite a recognition that Sturrup is "out of the mainstream of case law on equal protection analysis"96 and while
hinting its disapproval of overbreadth scrutiny in this class of
cases, the court held that it was necessary to follow the Indiana
Supreme Court. Barteau wrote: ''This obligation binds us even
where our supreme court has explained neither the rationale
nor the 'constitutional implications' of its decisions." 97
The court went on to suggest a possible rationale for the
Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Sturrup. "[l]t is conceivable that our Supreme Court could decide that a Sturrup-like
overbreadth analysis in equal protection cases is proper under
our Indiana Constitution, even if such analysis is not available
under the U.S. Constitution."98 As noted earlier, this possible
rationale is supported by a long line of Indiana cases, but not
suggested in Sturrup itself.

4. Problems with the application of Sturrup
As illustrated by Judge Barteau, Sturrup suffers from all
of the deficiencies associated with rational basis with teeth
analysis generally. Sturrup created confusion as to what standard of review should be applied in athletic eligibility cases.
The Sturrup court's failure to identify the factors which justify
using heightened scrutiny makes the decision seem arbitrary,
and akin to the judicial interventionism associated with the
Lochner era. 99 During the Lochner era, the U.S. Supreme
Court applied a highly subjective substantive due process analysis to the objectives, means and effects of legislation. In
Schafer, it appears that Judge Barteau did not understand the
rationale for employing an overbreadth analysis. He could not
identify any special classification or interest involved that
would trigger a level of review less deferential than rational
basis scrutiny. Yet rational basis with teeth resembles intermediate scrutiny without an accompanying justification for its

96. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d at 553.
97. ld.; See also Patton v. State, 507 N.E.2d 875, 878-79 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
98. Schafer, 598 N.E.2d at 554, n.9.
99. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (law limiting maximum hours
for bakery employees violates 14th Amendment); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915) (state law requiring employees to agree not to join a labor union invalidated
under 14th Amendment); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (minimum wage law invalidated under 14th Amendment); Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co.,
270 U.S. 402 (1926) (state law banning all use of shoddy fabrics for bedding invalidated under 14th Amendment).
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application of the "substantially related to an important state
interest" standard. By employing overbreadth analysis, Judge
Barteau, in effect, used the same standard as that used in
many intermediate scrutiny cases. This, of course, would not be
a problem if all high school athletics cases looked exactly like
Sturrup. Yet, as illustrated in Schafer and, more clearly, in
Thomas v. Greencastle Community School Corp., 100 Sturrup
did not create a rule which could be applied with any consistency or predictability.

B.
1.

Thomas v.

Greencastle Community School Corp. 101

Facts of the case

During his junior year, Shane Thomas was an outstanding
running back for the Greencastle High School football
team. 102 As a result of a learning disability, Thomas had repeated the second grade. 103 Therefore, Thomas turned 19
years of age during the summer before his senior year. 104 According to IHSAA Rule 4, any student turning 19 before August
15 could not participate in varsity athletics. 105 Thomas challenged his ineligibility on a theory that the class was underinclusive and violated his right to equal protection of the
law. 106 For example, while Thomas was being excluded from
varsity football due to advanced age, the rule would still allow
a student born on August 16 to compete in varsity baseball6 to
8 months after his 19th birthday. 107

2.

Procedural history

Thomas anticipated that the IHSAA would declare him
ineligible for varsity athletics during his senior year. 108
Therefore, Thomas proposed a rule change that would allow
him to play football the following year. 109 The IHSAA rejected

100. Thomas v. Greencastle Community Sch. Corp., 603 N.E.2d 190 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992).
101. !d.
102. !d. at 191.
103. !d. at 191-92.
104. !d. at 191.
105. !d.
106. !d. at 193-94.
107. !d. at 194.
108. !d. at 192.
109. !d.
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his proposal. 110 Thomas responded by filing a complaint for
injunctive and declaratory relief in which he sought to bar
enforcement against him of IHSAA Rule 4. 111 The IHSAA was
granted summary judgment at the trial level. The trial court
concluded that Rule 4 was rationally related to the objectives of
promoting the health and safety of participants in varsity
sports. 112

3.

Court of appeals

Thomas based his appeal on Sturrup and Schafer, contending that IHSAA rules were properly reviewed using a rational
basis with teeth analysis. 113 He argued that under-inclusiveness should be just as offensive and actionable as the overinclusive rules struck down earlier. 114 But Judge Sharpnack,
writing the opinion of the court, interpreted Sturrup and
Schafer narrowly. He wrote: "We read. . . Sturrup to require
the application of a modified rational basis test whereby we
first examine whether the rule is rationally related to a legitimate goal, and, if so, whether it sweeps too broadly ." 115 Since
the IHSAA rules implicated in Schafer were very similar to
those involved in Sturrup, the Schafer court was constrained to
follow the Sturrup methodology. But, concerning binding precedent for Thomas, Sharpnack wrote:
However, because the Sturrup court gave no reason for its
departure from traditional equal protection analysis and did
not provide any guidance as to its future implications, we
read Sturrup and Schafer narrowly. Where we are presented
with a rule similar to the ones involved in those cases, we will
examine them for rationality and broad over-inclusiveness,
but no more. 116
Thus, the court of appeals employed traditional rational basis
scrutiny to Rule 4, finding that it bears a rational relationship
to a legitimate state interest. 117 The court further held that a

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

I d.
Id.
Id.
I d.
ld.
ld.
I d.
117. Id.

at 191-92.
at 192.
at 193-94.
at 193.
at 194.
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classification may be substantially under-inclusive and still
rationally relate to its stated objective. 118

4.

Problems with the application of Sturrup

Like Schafer, this application of Sturrup also suffers from
all of the deficiencies associated with rational basis with teeth
analysis. Since the Sturrup court did not identify a quasi-suspect classification, or even the factors which justify using
heightened scrutiny, the Thomas court did not feel constrained
to employ a modified rational basis scrutiny analysis. Since
Thomas dealt with an under-inclusive classification, rather
than a Sturrup-like over-inclusive one, the court of appeals had
no guidance as to whether enhanced rational basis scrutiny
should apply.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Sturrup has led to much confusion in Indiana's lower
courts. Although it may be argued that Thomas and Schafer
are distinguishable, the mysterious underlying constitutional
principles of Sturrup cannot be cited as authority for such a
distinction. A fundamental problem with Sturrup and its progeny is that either no one knows the constitutional philosophy
behind modified rational basis scrutiny of certain IHSAA rules,
or no one has expressed it. It would appear that either the
Sturrup court's decision was constitutionally unjustifiable and
arbitrary or simply short-sighted and poorly drafted. As lower
courts are forced to follow Indiana Supreme Court precedent,
Sturrup will continue to be of only limited value because its
enigmatic drafting only allows it to be applied to cases very
similar to Sturrup itself.
With Sturrup the Indiana Supreme Court may have recognized a new class of people deserving of special judicial protection. Although not provided for by the Federal Constitution,
such protection might be derived from the Indiana Constitution. On the other hand, Sturrup may have been a prime example of sloppy, ends-oriented judicial rulemaking at its worst.
What the courts of Indiana, and concerned observers elsewhere,
deserve and expect is clarification of the issue from the court
promulgating the ruling. The Indiana Supreme Court should
grant certiorari to consider another case dealing with IHSAA
118. ld.
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bylaws and either satisfactorily explain its Sturrup decision, or
overturn it. In the meantime, however, the lower courts in
Indiana should follow the age-old practice of narrowly interpreting an unpopular, unclear or poorly reasoned rule. As
Thomas and Schafer illustrate, the rule will not clarify itself
merely through the passage of time.
Christopher D. Keeler

